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Abstract
This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm
chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are
complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with
that obtained in the literature assuming quantity competition.
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  The issue of the capacity chosen by firms in a mixed oligopoly has been analyzed by 
Wen and Sasaki (2001), Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) and Lu and Poddar (2005). These 
papers show that, in a mixed duopoly market, under Cournot competition with 
homogeneous products the public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while the 
private firm chooses excess capacity. This result is in sharp contrast with the conventional 
wisdom that holding excess capacity plays an essential role as a strategic device in the pure 
oligopoly market (see, for example, Dixit, 1980; Brander and Spencer, 1983 and Horiba 
and Tsutsui, 2000). Ogawa (2006) extends the above papers by assuming heterogeneous 
products in a mixed duopoly in which firms compete on quantities. He shows that the 
public firm chooses over-capacity when products are complements and under-capacity 
when products are substitutes. 
 
In this paper we analyze the issue of the capacity chosen by firms in a mixed duopoly 
by considering that firms compete on prices.
1 Thus we analyze whether the type of 
competition in the product market affects the results obtained by the papers cited above. 
We obtain that when products are substitutes, the private firm chooses under-capacity 
and the public firm chooses over-capacity. When products are complements, both 
firms choose under-capacity. Therefore, the result obtained in this paper is in contrast 
with that obtained in the relevant literature by assuming that firms compete on 
quantities.  
 
2 The model 
 
  We consider an economy comprising one private firm and one public firm, denoted by 
1 and 2, respectively. On the consumption side, there is a continuum of consumers of the 
same type whose utility function is linear. The representative consumer maximizes U(q1, 
                                                 
1 There are few papers analyzing the case in which firms decide prices. See, for example, Anderson et al. 
(1997), Tasnádi (2006), Ogawa and Kato (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz (2007). 
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q2)–p1q1–p2q2, where qi≥0 is the amount of the good i and pi is its price (i = 1, 2). The 
function U(q1, q2) is assumed to be quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q1 and q2:  
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where parameter b measures the degree to which goods are substitutes. If b∈(0, 1) 
products are substitutes while if b∈(-1, 0) products are complements. Demand functions 











= , i ≠ j;  i, j = 1 ,   2 .        ( 1 )  
 
  The two firms have the same technology, represented by the cost function: C(qi, xi), 
where qi and xi are the production and capacity, respectively, of firm i. Following Vives 
(1986), Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) and Lu and Podar (2005), we specify the cost 
function as: 
 
C(qi, xi) = m qi + (qi – xi)2, i= 1, 2. 
 
This cost function shows that excess capacity or under-capacity would prove inefficient. In 
fact, when quantity equals capacity the long-run average cost is minimized.
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  The profit function of firm i is given by: 
 
  πi = pi qi – mqi – (qi – xi)2, i= 1 ,   2 ,         ( 2 )  
 
where qi is given by (1). We measure social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus (denoted 
by CS) and producer surplus (denoted by PS). Therefore, social welfare is given by:  
                                                 
2 We assume a > m to assure that the production level of both firms is positive. 




W = CS + PS,               ( 3 )  
 
where PS = π1 + π 2 and consumer surplus is given by: 
 
CS = U(q1, q2) – p1 q1 – p2 q2 = 
) 1 ( 2
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  The objective of this paper is to analyze the strategic choice of capacity made by firms 
in a mixed duopoly under price competition. To that end we propose a two-stage game 
with the following timing. In the first stage firms choose their capacity simultaneously and 
independently. In the second stage, after observing the capacity choice, firms choose their 
prices simultaneously and independently. We solve the game by backward induction from 




  In the second stage of the game, given the production capacities chosen by firms in 
the first stage, the private firm chooses the price, p1, that maximizes its profit while the 
public firm chooses the price, p2, that maximizes social welfare. Solving these problems we 
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  As firms compete on prices in the product market, when products are substitutes, 
b∈(0,1), if one firm raises its price the other firm will react by raising its price too. By    
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contrast, when products are complements, b∈(-1,0), if one firm raises its price the other 
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  In the first stage, firms decide their capacity level. In this stage, given (6), the private 
firm chooses the capacity, x1, that maximizes its profit and the public firm chooses the 
capacity, x2, that maximizes social welfare. Solving these problems we obtain: 
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  It has to be noted that the sign of the denominator in (7) is always positive for b∈(-1,1). 
From (1), (6) and (7) we obtain: 
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  Finally, from (7) and (8) it is easy to obtain that: 
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  From (9), the following result is obtained. 
 
Proposition. Under price competition, when the products are substitutes the public firm 
chooses over-capacity, x2>q2, and when the products are complements it chooses under-
capacity, x2<q2. The private firm chooses under-capacity, x1<q1, in both cases. 
 
  The explanation of this result is as follows. Given that the public firm 
maximizes social welfare it cares about the consumer surplus and, thus, about the 
output of industry. As a result, the public firm tries to make the private firm produce a 
great deal in the duopoly market. However, as firms compete on prices, when 
products are substitutes the private firm tries to increase its price in order to reduce 
market competition. When products are complements the private firm has incentives 
to reduce its price.  
 
  When products are substitutes, from (6) we obtain that there is a negative 
relationship between the capacity level of the public firm and the price level of the 
private firm and, thus, a positive relationship with the output level of the private firm. 
In this case, the public firm can improve social welfare by increasing its own 
capacity. Similarly, there is a negative relationship between the capacity level of the 
private firm and the price level of the public firm and, thus, a positive relationship 
with the output level of the public firm. In this case, the private firm can reduce 
market competition by decreasing its own capacity. Hence, the private firm chooses 
under-capacity and the public firm chooses over-capacity.  
 
  When the products are complements, a reduction in the capacity level of the 
public (private) firm reduces the price of the private (public) firm and thus increases 
the output level of the private (public) firm. Hence, the over-capacity strategy for the    
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public firm does not carry over into the case of products which are complements. In 




In this paper we consider product differentiation in a mixed duopoly model in 
which firms compete on prices to get new results concerning the capacity choice 
behavior of public firms. The main result obtained in literature when firms compete 
on quantities and products are heterogeneous is that in the mixed duopoly both the 
public and private firms strategically choose over-capacity when products are 
complements. When products are substitutes the public firm chooses under-capacity 
and the private firm over-capacity. We show in this paper that these results are not 
robust to changes in the type of competition in the product market. In fact, under 
price competition the opposite result is obtained: the public firm chooses over-
capacity when products are substitutes, and under-capacity when products are 
complements; the private firm always chooses under-capacity. 
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